Legal Implications of Video Surveillance on Transit Systems (2018) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 11-17
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11 As for cameras with capabilities for facial recognition, identification, and automatic tracking, one source asserts that such technologies are highly invasive because they permit surveillance that exceeds the power of normal observation of individuals in public.110 Cameras with pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) capability raise privacy concerns because they permit operators to target individuals, for example, because of their race or attractiveness.111 The ability to retain and/or disseminate images permits private activities and moments to be displayed publicly.112 Some localities, such as New York City, reportedly prohibit the use of PTZ technologies.113 Unless there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Pittsburgh prohibits the use of PTZ cameras and automatic tracking and identification.114 Nevertheless, under current constitutional jurisprudence, a warrant generally is not required to use public video surveillance to identify or track someone whose image is captured by video surveillance.115 In United States v.
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12 Privacy rights have been defined as the right both to control the dissemination of one's information124 and the right to be free from government intrusion.125 Although a "cluster of constitutional rights" protects citizens from various forms of government intrusion, decisions by the United States Supreme Court in recent years have narrowed an individual's zone of privacy protected by the United States Constitution.126 An article published in 1890 by Samuel D Warren and Louis D
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13 that since the Griswold decision a "‘right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.'"145 Nevertheless, the court held that the right to privacy does not emanate from the "penumbra of other fundamental rights" but is "founded" in the Fourteenth Amendment's "concept of personal liberty."146 The Borucki court recognized that the Third and Fifth Circuits had held "that there is an independent right of confidentiality applicable to personal information contained in medical, financial, and other personal records."147 However, the court held that the "[t] he personal rights found in this guarantee of personal privacy must be limited to those which are ‘fundamental' or ‘implicit within the concept of ordered liberty….'"148 Although the court recognized that "[m]
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14 decide whether privacy rights should be enlarged. In a concurring opinion in Riley v.
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15 law enforcement could place a beeper in a container and monitor the movements of the car in which the defendant placed the container.181 The only issue in Knotts was whether the monitoring of the car, not the installation of the beeper in the container, was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the government's action in monitoring the beeper signals was neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; therefore, a warrant was not required.182 The Court reversed the appellate court's reversal of the appellant's conviction.183 Likewise, regarding a transit customer's public activity, in 1999 in Wyoming v.
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16 reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.'"200 A violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs when the government violates a person's reasonable expectation of privacy without a warrant.201 However, the use by transit agencies of video surveillance does not involve a warrantless physical trespass and search as occurred in the Jones case. Notably, the Jones Court did not decide whether the collection of the same information electronically and non-trespassorily that is available by visual observation would be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
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17 and high security zones, where people are already subject to a substantial degree of oversight and constraint."214 As one source notes, "[e] ven in the absence of any information that a terrorist attack is ‘imminent'…courts have allowed ongoing suspicionless searches to detect weapons at airports and federal buildings."215 C
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